


































Money shouts! How effective are punishments for accounting fraud?






Cyswllt i'r cyhoeddiad / Link to publication
Dyfyniad o'r fersiwn a gyhoeddwyd / Citation for published version (APA):
Wang, Y., Ashton, J. K., & Jaafar, A. (2019). Money shouts! How effective are punishments for
accounting fraud? British Accounting Review, 51(5), [100824].
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2019.02.006
Hawliau Cyffredinol / General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or
other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal
requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private
study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
 11. May. 2021
1 
 
Money shouts!  
How effective are punishments for accounting fraud? 
Yang Wanga,, John K. Ashtonb, Aziz Jaafarb  
Abstract 
This study examines the impact of different punishments for Chinese accounting fraud 
on shareholder valuation of firms between 2007 and 2016. From an examination of both 
monetary and non-monetary ‘name and shame’ penalties, it is reported all punishments 
have a negative and significant impact on the shareholder wealth of fraudulent firms. 
Investors perceive punishments involving monetary penalties far more severely than 
non-monetary punishments used to combat accounting fraud. Stock market reactions 
are also sensitive to the type of fraud committed with manipulation of recognition and 
disclosure fraud viewed more negatively by investors than fraud related to disclosure. 
Information leakage to capital markets prior to the announcement of punishments is 
also observed. It is proposed fines have been relatively more effective, than ‘name and 
shame’ punishments in addressing Chinese accounting fraud during the last decade, due 
not least to information leakage.  
Key words: Accounting fraud, Event study, Information leakage, Punishment, Stock 
market reaction 
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Money shouts! How effective are punishments for accounting fraud? 
1 Introduction 
Effective punishments are a crucial element of any fraud prevention program and signal 
the regulator’s anti-fraud stance. Punishments imposed on fraudulent firms must 
produce sufficient costs to outweigh the expected gains from fraud (Werden, 2009; 
Steinway, 2014). Further, if the punishments and enforcement mechanisms are effective 
the subsequent stock market reaction should increase the costs of fraud (Quan & Li, 
2017). Using a unique hand collected data set of financial statement fraud by Chinese 
listed firms between 2007 and 2016, this study examines the link between a range of 
monetary and non-monetary ‘name and shame’ punishments and associated stock 
market reactions.1  
Due to the rapid development of its economy and capital markets, the research context 
explored is China. China has the world’s second largest economy and capital markets 
with economic output of $12.01 trillion and a market capitalization of $8.71 trillion in 
2017 (World Bank, 2018). Major regulators of corporate conduct in China are the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), CSRC regional offices, stock exchanges 
and Ministry of Finance. These regulators can impose different punishments on 
fraudulent firms including fines, warnings, rectification notices, letters of warning, 
statements of regulatory concern, public criticism and public condemnation. The CSRC 
is the major securities regulator and its functions are similar to those of the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). However, Chinese investor protection 
and law enforcement level is relatively weak and public laws in China are often under 
or selectively enforced (Chen, Cumming, Hou, & Lee, 2016). Subsequently, a weak 
legal environment provides opportunities for the manipulation of financial statements. 
                                                             
1  To provide a more accurate estimation of investor reaction, samples are restricted into 
financial statement fraud. Most previous research on the economic consequences of fraud in 
China brings all types of fraud into scope e.g. financial fraud, market manipulation, insider 
trading and even corporate environment pollution (Aggarwal, Hu, & Yang, 2015). Given the 




In addition, most Chinese listed firms have a highly concentrated ownership structure, 
with often a single owner having effective control of the listed firm. As many of these 
controlling shareholders are state and quasi-state institutions, China’s corporate 
ownership structure offers a unique research setting (Jiang & Kim, 2015) very different 
to that seen in the U.S. or UK. 
This investigation is important as an effective punishment regime is essential for firms, 
regulators and investors. For firms, the public exposure of punishment underlines the 
unacceptability of the fraudulent behaviours and evokes public disapproval of 
wrongdoing. Negative publicity can foster normative attitudes against firm fraud and 
increase their willingness to invest in ‘beyond-compliance’ behaviours (Parker, 2006). 
For regulators, when the public becomes aware punishments are imposed for fraudulent 
behaviours, confidence in market supervision increases. An effective punishment 
mechanism therefore augments the legitimacy of supervision, creating a ‘tough’ image 
of public enforcement. For investors, an effective punishment mechanism alleviates 
information asymmetries in capital markets and incorporates conduct risks within 
investment decisions (Van-Erp, 2014). 
The empirical results show that stock market reactions to all punishments have been 
significant and negative. In particular, punishments involving monetary fines have a far 
stronger negative influence on stock market returns than other penalties. Stock market 
investors also discriminate among different types of fraud with investors reacting less 
negatively to the disclosure of fraud than the combination of recognition and disclosure 
of fraud. This study further shows that information leakage occurs before the 
announcement of formal sanction decisions. We report informed investors using this 
leaked information, view fines more negatively than other punishments. It is proposed 
within an environment of information leakage the potency of ‘name and shame’ 
penalties is reduced relative to monetary punishments.  
By examining monetary and non-monetary punishments in a Chinese context, this 
paper provides incremental contributions to the extant literature examining the 
regulation of fraud. First, the impact of both monetary penalties such as fines and non-
4 
 
monetary, ‘name and shame’ penalties are examined. The latter are often omitted in 
assessments of accounting fraud, despite longstanding concerns that imposing fines can 
become unfair and inefficient (Goodhart, 2017) or even amplify the behaviours of 
concern (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). Different from prior studies examining the 
effectiveness of fines, a statistical analysis is applied which overcomes practical 
difficulties involved in conducting field experiments (Holmas et al., 2010). In addition, 
previous studies on information leakage commonly focus on analyst recommendations 
(Lin and Lu, 2015), mergers and acquisitions (Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos, 2015) 
and share repurchase (Hao, 2016). The study complements this stream of literature by 
addressing the impact of information leakage on regulatory punishments and providing 
new evidence that informed investors rationally give monetary penalties greater 
weights than others punishments. This enables policy setters to assess the effectiveness 
of punishments and set stringent regulations to curb information leakage and insider 
trading. The implications drawn from this study are useful in understanding the 
effectiveness of punishments and related stock market reaction within developing 
economies with a similar legal environment. 
Second, the literature on Chinese accounting fraud (Chen et al., 2005; Sun and Zhang, 
2006) is extended by considering cases punished by the regional offices of the CSRC. 
These previously overlooked regional offices of the securities regulator account for 
more than 75% of the CSRC’s staffing (Xu and Xu, 2017) and use non-monetary 
punishments more frequently than CSRC central offices. By incorporating sanction 
decisions of regional offices in this assessment, the study finds the CARs triggered by 
punishment announcements are lower than other Chinese studies (Firth et al., 2009; Wu 
and Zhang, 2014). This implies punishments imposed by regional offices do not 
generate economically significant impacts on listed firms. In addition, this paper 
considers different supervisory measures imposed by regional offices, which has been 
overlooked by prior studies. Empirical findings suggest these supervisory measures are 
not perceived as severe retributive punishments by investors. Subsequently, it 
underscores the importance for future studies to include these cases as they have a 
5 
 
significant impact on the empirical results. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: The next section reviews the 
institutional background, theoretical framework, prior empirical findings and develops 
hypotheses. The third section discusses the data and the empirical approach. The fourth 
section reports the empirical results and the final section concludes the paper. 
 
2 Literature review 
2.1 Institutional background: regulatory enforcement 
China adopts a centralized approach to regulatory enforcement, in which the CSRC 
plays a key role by inspecting fraudulent activities committed by listed firms and 
imposing administrative punishments or non-administrative punishments to deter 
corporate fraud. Table 1 provides a brief comparison of the different types of 
punishments. Warnings are administrative sanctions used to caution listed firms and 
enable relevant individuals (investors) to be ‘mentally alert’ (Zhang & Zhao, 2007). 
The rectification notices, regulatory concern and letters of warning are highly time-
sensitive supervisory measures2 (CSRC, 2014). Regarding general problems, CSRC 
regional offices can issue letters of regulatory concern. In the case of moderately serious 
problems, the regulators can issue letters of warning or rectification notices to listed 
firms (CSRC, 2012). Public criticism and public condemnation are self-disciplinary 
measures3 that apply only to non-serious fraud with relatively minimal effects (Xu, 
Chen, & Xu, 2017). Monetary fines are regarded as a severe administrative punishment, 
with amounts ranging from 300,000 Yuan to 600,000 Yuan ($45,000 to $90,000) levied 
from firms against misrepresentation. Any punishment would result in increased 
                                                             
2 The details can be found in the Rules of Listed Firms’ on-site Inspections. Available at: 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200902/t20090203_69256.html (last visited 
on 17 May, 2018).  
3  See the Implementation Details of Self-regulatory Measures and Disciplinary Actions 
promulgated by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Available at: 
https://www.szse.cn/main/en/RulesandRegulations/SZSERules/GeneralRules/, 
http://english.sse.com.cn/laws/framework/c/3978489.pdf (last visited on 17 May, 2018). 
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regulatory scrutiny for the firm’s future refinancing, merger and acquisition activities 
and can be considered within future judgments (CSRC, 2013). 
Table 1 














































































In order to better understand these enforcement mechanisms, the types of enforcement 
actions taken by the U.S., UK and China’s securities regulators are compared in the 
Table 2. In the U.S., the SEC takes either administrative or civil actions against 
fraudsters. Similarly, the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is also allowed to 
issue civil proceedings in the high court to address accounting fraud. Civil actions are 
not allowed to be taken by the Chinese securities regulators. The SEC has increasingly 
relied on the monetary penalties with an average annual growth rate of 30% since 2000 
(Steinway, 2014). In contrast, the FCA and the CSRC rely more on non-monetary 
penalties to punish perpetrators. For instance, the average use of financial penalties to 




Table 2  
A comparison of enforcement actions across countries. 
Country U.S. UK China 
Securities 
regulator 
SEC FCA (FSA)4 CSRC 
Civil actions can 
be taken by the 
securities regulator 
Yes Yes No 






High Low None 
Major types of 
sanctions 
Cease and desist 
orders, suspension or 
revocation of broker-
dealer and investment 
advisor registrations, 
censures, bars from 
association with the 
securities industry, 
monetary penalties and 
disgorgements 
Variation/ cancellation/ 







disgorgement of illegal 
gains, banning of market 
entry, rectification 
notice, regulatory 








Monetary penalties Non-monetary penalties Non-monetary penalties 
 
Figure 1 shows the typical sequence of events within an enforcement action. Regulatory 
investigations are commonly triggered by whistleblowers, firms’ self-disclosure of 
malfeasance, restatements, auditor departures, unusual trading and regulators’ routine 
supervision (Karpoff, Lee, & Martin, 2008). If an official investigation is undertaken, 
the case will be referred to the enforcement department and investigated. When a case 
is deemed to be an administrative offence, the investigation notification is disclosed to 
                                                             
4 Since the 1st April 2013, the Financial Services Authority has been replaced by the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority. 
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the public. In contrast, the initial investigation notification is not publically disclosed if 
a case is not considered to be an administrative offence (CSRC, 2016).  
Before deciding to impose any administrative penalties, regulators have responsibilities 
to report the facts, grounds and regulatory basis of judgments (National People’s 
Congress, 2009). Once punishment files are approved by regulators, these are first sent 
to the listed firms and then made to public through designated national financial 
newspapers or the regulators’ official websites. 
                                                                              Enforcement period 
         Fraud period                                                     Regulatory period 
 
Fraud begins        Fraud ends   Trigger     Investigation        a*    File      Public                
                           events                                  approved  disclosure 
Fig. 1 Timeline of an enforcement action.  
Notes: a* represents the announcement of advance notice of a sanction decision, which 
is only applicable when the sanction decision is administrative in nature. 
 
2.2 Theoretical framework and prior empirical findings 
The choice to commit accounting fraud and subsequent punishments can also be viewed 
as an economic decision involving a cost and benefit trade-off. A manager’s likelihood 
of committing fraud depends on his or her perception of the probability of detection, 
the severity of expected punishments and the gains from fraud (Becker, 1968). A 
manager would therefore commit fraud, when punishments and the probability of 
capture are lower than the benefits obtained (Baucus & Baucus, 1997). To deter fraud, 
punishments must therefore produce sufficient disutility to outweigh gains from 
fraudulent behaviours (Werden, 2009). Such a relationship is not straightforward and 
may be affected by psychological factors. For instance, using an ‘inspection game’, 





in deterring non-compliance, than bonuses were in encouraging compliance. In 
summary, the effectiveness of legal punishments in deterring offending depends on the 
certainty, severity and celerity of punishments. 
While these direct rewards from fraud can be attractive to perpetrators, offending 
creates a diversity of costs. First, firms that engage in fraudulent behaviours incur direct 
costs including regulatory fines and court-imposed penalties (Zeidan, 2013). Second, 
fraudulent firms can face a wide range of reputational costs often exceeding legal 
penalties (Karpoff & Lott, 1993). The intangible reputational costs reflect the 
capitalization of expected losses resulting from deteriorated relationships with firm 
owners (shareholders), customers, financiers, managers and suppliers (Autore, Hutton, 
Peterson, & Smith, 2014). For instance, trading partners may become skeptical about 
the firm’s future financial statements and adversely revise terms of trade increasing 
contracting costs. Similarly, finance providers may offer less generous terms to 
fraudulent firms (Armour, Mayer, & Polo, 2017) and customers may punish fraudulent 
firms through lower sales or boycott. For managers, punishments may redirect actions 
towards remedying the consequences of punishments rather than profitable projects 
(Aguzzoni, Langus, & Motta, 2013). For shareholders, a diversity of responses may 
arise. A damaged reputation can deter investment in the fraudulent firms and increase 
the cost of capital (Zeidan, 2013). Shareholders may also undertake legal actions 
against fraudulent firms. Equally, shareholders may sell shares in fraudulent firms, 
reducing the offenders’ market valuation. This last issue has been the focus of a 
considerable international literature, assessing the reputational costs imposed by 
corporate punishments.  
There are also geographical differences in stakeholders’ perceptions of regulatory 
punishments specific to China. The existence of Guanxi, a Chinese term for personal 
relationships (Chen, Cheng, Gong, & Tan, 2014) may lessen the effects of fraudulent 
firms’ relationship with stakeholders. With greater financial and regulatory resources 
from the state, stakeholders may perceive Guanxi-connected firms are more likely to 
recover from punishments and reevaluate their investment decisions accordingly (Chen 
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et al., 2016). 
The reputational effects punishments impose been examined internationally within 
examinations of shareholder wealth losses such as CARs using event study approaches. 
Most work has considered market responses to regulatory announcements, with a 
smaller literature considering how markets respond to the imposition of different types 
of penalties. 
Studies examining market responses to regulatory announcements have consistently 
reported negative responses to the disclosure of regulatory announcements (see Karpoff 
et al., 2008). For example, in the U.S., abnormal returns of -5.3% on the announcement 
day of financial restatements have been reported (Palmrose, Richardson, & Scholz, 
2004). Similarly for the UK, Armour et al. (2017) report regulatory enforcement actions 
led to CARs of -1.26% on the event day and a CAR of -1.68% over a 3-day event 
window for offending firms. An increasing number of Chinese studies have also 
examined if stock market reactions to the announcement of fraud was accompanied by 
a decline of -1% to -2% in affected firms’ stock prices in a short-term event window 
(Wu & Zhang, 2014). For instance, Chen et al. (2005) identify 169 firms disciplined by 
the CSRC and two stock exchanges, reporting enforcement actions had a negative 
impact on the stock returns of -1.8% in a five-day event window. Similarly, Sun and 
Zhang (2006) examine the announcement of enforcement sanctions reporting the 
average CAR was -1.4%.  
Market reactions to individual fraud punishments have also been examined. For China, 
Quan and Li (2017) report fines had a negative influence on firm values. Examinations 
of the costs imposed by non-monetary penalties on firm value have been more 
piecemeal. For instance within China the effects of punishments imposed on 
independent directors was deemed to be significantly negative (Quan & Li, 2017) and 
that markets react more negatively to constraints placed on a director’s current and 
future employment and promotion opportunities than monetary penalties (Hung, Wong, 
& Zhang, 2015). 
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When considering the costs imposed by different forms of punishments, fines have 
often been the primary focus of interest due to their gravity and multiple effects. For 
instance, fines can impose large reputational costs (Sun & Zhang, 2006, Karpoff, Lee, 
& Martin, 2007), directly reduce corporate cash flows and existing assets and alter 
investors’ expectations of firm liquidity and future earnings. These monetary 
punishments are sometimes supplemented with non-monetary, ‘name and shame’ 
punishments. These punishments aim to directly degrade firm reputations through 
public denunciation (Zhang & Zhao, 2007), imposing a wider social costs on firms 
(D'Antoni & Galbiati, 2005) and deterring listed firms from committing fraud (Karpoff 
et al. 2007).  
Empirical findings are mixed with regards to the efficiency of fines. Cherry (2001) 
provides evidence that financial penalties such as fines and forfeitures provide a 
considerable deterrent effect comparable to those provided by prison sentences. Cherry 
suggests policymakers should reconsider financial penalties as an alternative to 
criminal sanctions these can significantly reduce criminal justice expenditure. In 
contrast, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) examine whether fines can reduce the 
occurrence of the late-arrival behaviour and report fines do not change the sanctioned 
behaviour. Similarly, Holmas et al. (2010) analyze the impact of fining owners of long-
term care institutions who prolong length of stay at hospitals. They find hospital length 
of stay is longer when monetary fines are introduced.  
Market reactions to regulatory announcements also vary with the type of fraudulent 
behaviours addressed such as income statement fraud and disclosure fraud (Zhu & Gao, 
2011). Income statement fraud is thought to elicit the strongest negative response from 
investors, as such restatements affect central business operations (Kravet & Shevlin 
2010). Anderson and Yohn (2002) find that negative market reaction is most 
pronounced for firms with revenue recognition restatements in U.S. Similarly, Desai, 
Hogan and Wilkins (2006) state financial restatements caused by improper revenue 
(cost) recognition generate a large CARs of -14.89%. In China income performance is 
an important criteria for firm authorization of IPO and right issues and avoidance of 
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delisting. Income statement fraud is also positively associated with the likelihood of 
shareholder litigation, suggesting that investors regard the income statement 
manipulation as serious fraud and signaling the capital market that management is 
incompetent (Palmrose & Scholz, 2004). 
Investors could also treat omitted or improperly disclosed and recognized information 
distinctly (Michels, 2017). Recognized information is reported in the consolidated 
financial statements, while disclosed information is stated in the notes to the financial 
statements and other sections. 5  Due to its positioning investors may perceive 
recognized information as more reliable than disclosed information with the latter easier 
to manipulate and more tolerated by auditors. In addition, recognized information (i.e. 
accounting earnings) is typically specified in executive compensation contracts. 
Therefore, managers are likely to engage in fraud to meet the requirements of 
recognized information and obtain more performance-linked-salary (Li, Lou, Wang, & 
Yuan, 2013). Prior empirical findings also indicate that earnings restatements have had 
a far greater negative influence than restatement of omitted and restated notes or 
disclosure (Robbani & Bhuyan, 2010).  
 
2.3 Hypotheses development 
This study assumes fraud occurs as perpetrators believe the benefits obtained from 
fraud outweigh the costs of punishment and probability of being caught. As a fine is 
one of the most severe administrative punishments which can be imposed on a listed 
firm (Firth et al., 2016), monetary penalties should lead to more severe effects on 
shareholder wealth than non-monetary penalties. In addition, according to the CSRC 
regulatory documents, severe punishments are imposed on firms if their acts are 
particularly adverse, disturbing the order of the securities market and incurring serious 
                                                             
5  These sections include corporate governance, internal control, share changes and 
shareholders, important matters, reports of the board of directors and summary of accounting 
data and financial indicators sections. These sections are the contents and formats standards 
required by the CSRC with regards to compile annual reports (CSRC, 2014). 
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social impacts or damage to the interests of investors (CSRC, 2008). Compared to non-
monetary punishments, imposing fines signal the seriousness of fraud, thus generating 
considerable negative effects on a firm’s stock prices.  
Empirical support for the effectiveness of monetary penalty has been reported by some 
prior studies. For instance, Kurz et al. (2014) report that when a fine for late-coming is 
framed in a retributive way rather than a compensatory way, people experienced late-
coming to a larger extent as moral transgression. Swanepoel and Meiring (2018) find 
that fines are more effective than imprisonment for fraud, corruption or tax-related 
offences. In addition, if the level of fines cannot be raised further, it would be 
appropriate to supplement such fines with a prison term for fraud. Subsequently, the 
use of fines can better achieve the deterrent and retributive goals of punishment (Chen 
et al., 2011). Therefore, this study posits the following hypothesis.  
H1:  Fines result in a more negative stock market reaction than non-monetary 
punishments. 
As different types of fraud illicit distinct market reactions, the type of fraud perpetuated 
is examined. The manipulation of recognition items affects corporate core accounts. 
These accounts reflect the central operations of the business, which are essential for 
financial reporting users to forecast future earnings and cash flows (Kravet and Shevlin, 
2010). Subsequently, stock returns decrease more for restatements affecting corporate 
core earnings (Du, 2017). Consistent with this argument, Li et al. (2018) find that 
financial restatements caused by improper revenue recognition generate a significant 
CARs of -1.9% over a three-day event window.  
Concerns can also arise when managers strategically obfuscate using legal jargon and 
technical accounting terms (Amel-Zadeh and Faasse, 2016). Such practices can create 
information overload for investors (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003); a practice seen to be 
particularly acute for disclosure items (Hirst et al., 2004). Subsequently, investors tend 
to underestimate the importance of disclosed information. Israeli (2015) finds evidence 
that investors place smaller valuation weights on disclosed than on recognized 
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analogous Statement of Financial Position and Income Statement amounts. This 
suggests that market participants do not perceive disclosed information as a substitute 
for recognized information in determining a firm’s value. Such a valuation effect is 
stronger if firms manipulate both recognition and disclosure items, signaling the 
severity of fraudulent behaviours and the ineffectiveness of internal control 
mechanisms. As a result, investors may react more to punishments for both recognition 
and disclosure fraud than single disclosure fraud. Hence, this study proposes the 
following. 
H2:   Markets react more negatively to both recognition and disclosure fraud 
than only to disclosure fraud. 
Previous studies of Chinese capital markets report significant abnormal returns prior to 
mergers and acquisitions (Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos, 2015) and share repurchase 
announcements (Hao, 2016). The announcements are leaked to the capital market 
before formal disclosure and involve illegal insider trading activities. Unlike other 
developed stock markets, trading on Chinese capital markets is mostly undertaken by 
individuals rather than institutional investors (Reuters, 2015). This exacerbates free-
rider problems, increases information asymmetries and enhances the possibility of 
information leakage. Therefore, information leakage occurring prior to the punishment 
announcements is expected.  
Information leakage may also be used strategically by managers to soften the impact of 
regulatory announcements. That is, managers have incentives to leak punishment news 
to selected influential investors (i.e. controlling shareholders and board of directors) 
who may trade on this news prior to its public announcement (Campbell et al., 2016). 
Additionally, regulatory insiders could leak punishment information to their 
stakeholders and profitably trade on such information (Huang, 2007). Consistent 
empirical findings are reported by Song and Han (2017), who find stock returns drop 
significantly prior to the announcement of corporate wrongdoings in South Korea. 
Within an environment with information leakage, informed investors perceive fines as 
the most severe punishment, as fines are retributive rather than compensatory (Kurz et 
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al., 2014). In other words, an informed investor is more likely to see fines as a means 
by which one is punished for breaching regulations rather than an opportunity to 
compensate the victims of fraudulent activities. Therefore, this study hypothesizes: 
H3:   There is information leakage prior to the announcement of punishment 
information and informed investors perceive fines more severely than 
other punishments. 
 
3 Data and research design 
This study uses a hand-collected dataset of regulatory determinants (i.e. punishments, 
fraud and duration) based on the sanction reports issued by regulators. The stock returns, 
financial and corporate governance data are collected from the CSMAR database. The 
sample period runs from 2007 to 2016 to accommodate new accounting standards 
adopted in 2007. Cases where initial announcement dates are unavailable are excluded, 
leaving the final sample of 433 fraud cases.6 
An event study methodology is used as it measures the impact of unanticipated events 
on stock prices. The event date is defined as the earliest date that the market learns a 
firm is subject to a sanction decision. This study chooses a 140-day estimation period 
comprising trading days [-155, -16] and several different event windows, (i.e. [0, 2],  
[-1, 1], [-1, 2], [-2, 2], [-3, 3], [-5, 5]) to capture the shareholder wealth effect of 
punishments (Chen et al., 2005). For a stock to be included in the sample, it must have 
no missing return data in the event window and at least two-thirds of daily stock return 
                                                             
6 The initial search reports 794 available fraud cases. This study excludes 187 cases where the 
initial disclosure dates of punishments are unavailable. These 187 cases are only shown in the 
files named Announcement on Supervision Measures or Penalties or Rectifications Taken by 
Securities Regulatory Authorities and Stock Exchange against the Company in Past 5 Years, 
which are separate files issued by listed firms in order to summarize punishments imposed in 
last five years. For the remaining fraud cases, stock return data is downloaded with 461 cases 
having sufficient daily trading data for further analysis. For firms that are punished by 
regulators multiple times in the same reporting year, the final punishment case of each firm is 
included because the impacts of previous punishment announcements on stock prices have been 
incorporated in the estimation windows of the capital asset pricing model. Subsequently, 433 
fraud cases are obtained for assessment. 
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data available in the estimation window (Agrawal & Cooper, 2015). The returns of the 
value-weighted market index (Shanghai & Shenzhen) is used as benchmark returns. 
Moreover, the daily stock returns have been adjusted for cash dividends reinvested 
(Cheung, Jiang, Limpaphayom, & Lu, 2010).  
Normal returns are estimated based on the capital asset pricing model (see MacKinlay, 
1997), which reflects a linear relationship between the excess return of an individual 
stock and the excess return of market portfolios. 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) 
(1) 
Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the actual rate of return of stock 𝑖 on day t, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the rate of return 
of a market portfolio of stocks on day t, 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the daily risk-free interest rate and 𝛽𝑖 
is the systematic risk of stock 𝑖. The difference between actual and normal stock returns 
represents the stock market reaction to the announcement of sanction decisions and is 
termed abnormal returns (Kouwenberg & Phunnarungsi, 2013). Having obtained the 
abnormal returns for stock 𝑖 , all the abnormal returns over the time period can be 
aggregated to the value of cumulative abnormal returns. 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) 
(2) 
An appropriate empirical approach is determined following pre-testing of the data. 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are assessed using Modified Wald and 
Wooldridge tests. The dataset displays heteroskedasticity but no serial correlation. 
Therefore, a panel data regression is adapted to examine the effectiveness of 
punishments. A Hausman test indicates that a fixed effects model is appropriate, a 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test confirms that a random effect model is not 
appropriate and further tests verify time or industry fixed effects are not required.7 
Subsequently, following Kim and Zhang (2016), a firm fixed effects regression model 
is used. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering as some firms have 
                                                             
7 Joint F tests indicate that the coefficients for all years (and industries) are jointly equal to 
zero, therefore no time fixed effects or industry fixed effects are needed in this case. This test 
is undertaken using the Stata procedure TestParm (Ashton & Hudson, 2014). 
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repeatedly committed fraud over years (Ewelt-Knauer, Knauer, & Lachmann, 2015). A 
dynamic panel data model is not used as the lagged dependent variable i.e. lagged CARs 
are the stock market reaction to a random event, thus do not have any economic 
meaning relating to fraud. The regression model is estimated as follows (Yu, 2013). 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
𝛽𝑖 and 𝛾𝑖 represent the coefficients to be estimated, 𝛼𝑖 is the firm fixed effects and 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. When examining the relationships between stock market reaction 
and different punishments or fraud, following Firth et al. (2016) and Chen et al. (2016), 
the dependent variable CARs is based on a [-2, 2] event window. To examine 
information leakage, CARs over a pre-event window [-15, -6] are used as the dependent 
variable. Test variables include both punishment and fraud dummy variables. There are 
seven punishment variables including warnings, fines, criticism, condemnation, 
rectification notices, regulatory concern and letters of warning. The fraud variables 
capture the type of fraud including recognition fraud, disclosure fraud and both 
recognition and disclosure fraud.8 Warnings and recognition fraud are selected as the 
reference groups in this study. 
Fraud duration reflects the effectiveness of internal control and external supervision 
and is used as a control variable. As greater fraud duration signals the ineffectiveness 
of corporate internal control mechanisms and the likelihood of further bad news, this 
variable is expected to be negatively associated with investor reaction (Zhu & Gao, 
2011). Firm size is also considered, as larger firms are better equipped to bear the 






                                                             
8 Following Zhu and Gao (2011), a content analysis method is used to code different types of 
fraud. Recognition fraud includes manipulation of income statements, balance sheets, cash flow 
statements and improper financial statements consolidation. Disclosure fraud includes delayed 




Variable definition and sources. 




















Equals to one if a firm is subject to public condemnation and 
zero otherwise 
Manual 
Fines Equals to one if a firm is subject to fines and zero otherwise Manual 
Rectification 
notice 
Equals to one if a firm has received a rectification notice from 




Equals to one if a firm has received a regulatory concern from 




Equals to one if a firm has received a letter of warning from a 







Equals to one if a firm manipulates its income statements, 




Equals to one if a firm manipulates its income statements, 
balance sheets, cash flows and conceals or untruthfully 
discloses information and zero otherwise 
Manual 
Disclosed 
Equals to one if a firm conceals or untruthfully discloses 





Calculated from the first fraud year to the last fraud year 
reported in the sanction files 
Manual 
Firm size The natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets CSMAR 
Largest 
ownership 
The number of shares held by the largest shareholder divided 
by the total number of shares outstanding 
CSMAR 
Ownership form 
Equals to one if the nature of the largest shareholder is state-
owned and zero otherwise 
CSMAR 
Institutional 
The number of shares held by institutional investors divided 








Equals to one if a firm experiences CEO turnover and zero 
otherwise 
CSMAR 
Big ten audit 




The number of shares held by the CEO divided by the total 





Chairman and CEO changes and big ten auditors are also added as control variables. 
The Chairman and CEO variables are consolidated to determine whether investors 
perceive such changes as a symbolic gesture or a substantive act for a firm to start fresh 
(Moore, Stuart, & Pozner, 2010). Moreover, when there is a chairman or CEO change, 
time is needed to address the fraud and take corrective measures. Therefore, investors 
are expected to have less confidence in new chairmen and managers leading firms after 
the announcement of punishments. The big ten auditors are included as these 
institutions may produce higher quality audits and apply stricter external monitoring, 
alleviating reputational costs and possible litigation (Chen et al., 2005). Past evidence 
also suggests fraudulent firms are less likely to hire big external auditors (Ma, Ma, & 
Tian, 2016).  
Following Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira and Matos, (2011) this study assumes institutional 
ownership captures the monitoring function played by the institutional investors. In 
contrast to U.S. stock markets, corporate ownership is highly concentrated in China 
with state institutions major block-holders. As state-owned firms are likely to receive 
greater government financial support and face lower default risks, a positive 
relationship between the type of shareholders (i.e. firms with state-owned background) 
and CARs may occur (Chen et al., 2016). Therefore, largest ownership and ownership 
form are also used as control variables. CEO ownership is also controlled as mangers 
receiving greater equity-based compensation have substantial discretion in pursuing 
private interests (Ding, Zhang, & Zhang, 2007). Except for fraud duration, the control 
variables are lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity problems. Table 3 summarizes 
the definition and sources of the variables.  
 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used. The mean of CARs is -0.5% 
over a 5-day [-2, 2] event window and smaller than comparable U.S. findings (Palmrose 
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et al., 2004). Rectification notices are the most common punishments, accounting for 
53.3% of the sample. 18.7% of fraudulent firms have received administrative fines on 
average. Firms subject to public criticism and condemnation account for 7.4% and 4.8% 
of all listed firms during the sample period, suggesting self-disciplinary measures are 
applied relatively less frequently. The table also provides statistics of fraud type. 
Consistent with previous Chinese studies (see Zhu & Gao 2011), disclosure fraud has 




Variable N Mean Median SD Kurtosis Skewness 
CARs (-2, 2) 433 -0.005 -0.007 0.057 0.215 3.910 
Warnings 433 0.157 0 0.364 1.885 4.554 
Criticism 433 0.074 0 0.262 3.257 11.611 
Condemnation 433 0.048 0 0.215 4.204 18.670 
FINEs 433 0.187 0 0.390 1.605 3.576 
Rectification notice 433 0.533 1 0.499 -0.134 1.018 
Regulatory concern 433 0.081 0 0.273 3.076 10.459 
Letter of warning 433 0.067 0 0.250 3.465 13.003 
Recognized 433 0.217 0 0.413 1.372 2.884 
Recognized & Disclosed 433 0.291 0 0.455 0.920 1.847 
Disclosed 433 0.485 0 0.500 0.060 1.004 
Duration 433 1.995 1 1.915 2.625 13.909 
Firm size 433 21.554 21.408 1.308 0.489 3.295 
Largest ownership 433 0.328 0.307 0.146 0.516 2.932 
Ownership form 433 0.210 0 0.408 1.423 3.024 
Institutional 433 0.045 0.017 0.086 4.134 22.492 
Chairman change 433 0.187 0 0.390 1.605 3.576 
CEO change 433 0.219 0 0.414 1.356 2.839 
Big ten audit 433 0.4 0 0.490 0.410 1.168 
CEO ownership 433 0.024 0 0.096 4.998 31.088 
On average, the duration of fraud is 2 years, with the longest fraud being 15 years. The 
average firm size, based on a firm’s total assets is $985 million; institutional investors 
                                                             
9 Warnings and fines can be imposed either separately or in combination. In particular, firms 
subject to warnings (only) and fines (only) account for 0.9% and 3.9% of total observations. 
14.8% firm-year observations receive the joint-punishment. See Table 7 for additional analysis. 
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and CEOs hold 4.5% and 2.4% of the shares of fraudulent firms respectively; lower 
than many other financial markets. Chinese listed firms usually have large controlling 
shareholders and the largest shareholder on average holds 32.8% of the total 
outstanding shares. Moreover, the state is the largest shareholder in 21% of sample 
firms. Overall, 18.7% of and 21.9% of firms have changed Chairmen and CEOs in the 
year prior to the fraud announcement. Firms that employ one of the big-ten auditors 
account for 40% of the sample.  
In an untabulated correlation analysis of the variables, this study finds that warnings 
are significantly positive correlated with fines, implying regulators use these 
punishments in combination. The variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics indicate that 
multicollinearity problems are minimal.10  
4.2 Univariate analysis 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the stock market reaction to punishment announcements 
over a variety of event windows. A large portion of reported CARs are significantly 
negative, suggesting stock markets view the announcement of sanction decisions 
negatively. For example, the CARs is -0.5% over a 4-day [-1, 2] event window and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. In addition, 58.66% of observations have 
negative CARs among the full sample. The shareholder wealth loss represents investors’ 
loss of confidence about the firms’ future performance, the increase of firm’s future 
costs due to punishments, or the negative reputation generated by the adverse publicity 
(Chen et al., 2005). In Panel A, CARs range from -0.2% to -0.5% for the overall sample 
and are statistically but not economically significant.11 This is lower than other Chinese 
studies (Firth et al. 2009; Wu & Zhang 2014), where fraud announcements trigger   -
1% to -2% CARs in short-term event windows, albeit for data which does not 
                                                             
10 The values of mean VIF are less than two for the different models. Normality based on 
skewness and kurtosis is also examined. For non-dummy variables that show substantial 
departure from normality, robustness checks are conducted in Table 7 (Model 12). 
11 Economic significance is a measure of the importance of a relationship and considers the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients (Ziliak and McCloskey, 2013). 
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incorporate sanction decisions made by CSRC regional offices. 
Table 5 
Market reaction to punishments announcements. 
Panel A CARs around different event windows 
Event windows No. Coefficient Std. Err. t-stat P>|t| %(CAR<0) Wilcoxon z 
[-5, +5] 433 -0.004 0.004 -0.91 0.362 54.965% -4.893*** 
[-3, +3] 433 -0.002 0.003 -0.48 0.633 52.887% -2.970*** 
[-2, 2] 433 -0.005* 0.003 -1.86 0.063 56.813% -5.701*** 
[-1, 2] 433 -0.005** 0.002 -2.13 0.033 58.661% -6.311*** 
[-1, 1] 433 -0.003 0.002 -1.40 0.162 57.275% -4.694*** 
[0, 2] 433 -0.004* 0.002 -1.72 0.086 58.661% -5.150*** 
Panel B Average abnormal return on different event days 
Event day No. Coefficient    Std. Err. t-stat P>|t| %(AR<0) Wilcoxon z 
-5 433 -0.003** 0.001 -2.27 0.024 58.430% -3.528*** 
-4 433 -0.001 0.001 -0.67 0.505 57.506% -2.006** 
-3 433 0.002** 0.001 2.24 0.025 50.346% 0.851 
-2 433 0.001 0.001 0.26 0.791 54.042% -0.486 
-1 433 -0.001 0.001 -1.17 0.242 57.737% -2.975*** 
0 433 -0.001 0.001 -0.83 0.407 56.351% -2.199** 
1 433 -0.001 0.001 -0.59 0.557 55.427% -1.670* 
2 433 -0.002* 0.001 -1.81 0.070 57.044% -2.970*** 
3 433 0.001 0.001 0.87 0.384 52.194% -0.268 
4 433 0.001 0.001 0.08 0.933 51.732% -0.708 
5 433 0.001 0.001 1.01 0.315 52.194% -0.459 
Panel C CARs prior to punishment announcements 
Event windows No. Coefficient Std. Err. t-stat P>|t| %(CAR<0) Wilcoxon z 
[-15, -6] 433 -0.010** 0.004 -2.33 0.020 57.737% -8.698*** 
Panel D Average abnormal return on different pre-event days 
Event day No. Coefficient Std. Err. t-stat P>|t| %(AR<0) Wilcoxon z 
-15 433 -0.001 0.001 -0.44 0.657 51.963% -1.294 
-14 433 -0.001 0.001 -0.69 0.493 51.501% -0.837 
-13 433 -0.001 0.001 -1.18 0.238 57.275% -2.586*** 
-12 433 -0.001 0.001 -0.04 0.972 55.196% -1.818* 
-11 433 -0.002* 0.001 -1.65 0.099 54.734% -2.894*** 
-10 433 -0.001 0.001 -0.77 0.444 55.196% -2.253** 
-9 433 0.001 0.001 0.95 0.341 51.039% 0.217 
-8 433 -0.002* 0.001 -1.64 0.100 55.658% -2.534** 
-7 433 -0.001 0.001 -0.65 0.517 53.811% -1.294 
-6 433 -0.003** 0.001 -2.49 0.013 54.965% -2.373** 
Notes: ***, ** and *, denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Panel B presents the average abnormal return (AR) around the punishment 
announcement. The mean AR is -0.1% on the announcement day and 56.35% of 
observations have negative ARs. Panel C and D pertain to information leakage. Panel 
C shows statistically significant (5%) CARs of -1.0% over a 10-day event window    
[-15, -6]. Moreover, 57.74% observations have negative CARs, suggesting information 
leakage prior to the announcement of punishment information is widespread. The 
magnitude of loss in the pre-event window is large and twice as much as the largest loss 
reported around the punishment announcement. Panel D reports the average abnormal 
return prior to punishment announcements with a mean AR of -0.1% on both event days, 
-13 and -12, indicating punishment information begins to leak to the market almost 12-
13 days prior to its official announcement.12 
4.3 Multivariate analysis 
Model 1 of Table 6 produces findings consistent with hypothesis 1, i.e. fines are 
associated with more negative stock market reaction than other ‘name and shame’ non-
monetary punishments. This result indicates that investors perceive monetary penalties 
more severely than non-monetary penalties, which is in line with findings from Kurz et 
al. (2014), and Killias, Villettaz and Nunweiler-Hardegger (2016). Although non-
monetary punishments can trigger reputational losses, these punishments are not a sign 
of severe offences and their costs are limited. Subsequently, monetary punishments 
speak more loudly. 
Model 2 examines hypothesis 2. A significant and negative coefficient of -0.043 is 
reported for recognition and disclosure fraud and a non-significant coefficient is 
estimated for disclosure fraud. Consistent with hypothesis 2, investors perceive 
                                                             
12  Apart from parametric t-tests, a nonparametric test: Wilcoxon Signed-rank test is also 
applied. The test bears null hypothesis of an equal number of positive and negative cumulative 
abnormal returns for a given event window under the framework of binominal test. The 
Wilcoxon Signed-rank test considers both the sign and magnitude of abnormal returns and does 
not assume normality or infer the value of any population parameter (Huang, 2013). The 
Wilcoxon Z-statistics for all CARs over different event windows and ARs on event day -13, -
12, -11, -10,  -8, -6, -5, -4, -1, 0, 1, 2 are significant in Table 5.4, implying the rejection of null 
hypothesis and the results are not driven by the outliers (Modi, Wiles, & Mishra, 2015). 
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manipulation of both recognized and disclosed information more severely than false 
disclosed information. This result supports Israeli (2015) and Michels (2017)’s finding 
that investors place smaller valuation weights on disclosed events and underreact to 
these events due to higher processing costs. 
As information leakage is indicated, informed investors may transact to garner profits. 
CARs [-15, -6] are then used as the dependent variable to re-estimate the previous 
models and test the hypothesis 3. As shown in Model 3, monetary fines are negatively 
and statistically significant related to CARs. However, non-monetary penalties have no 
significant impact on stock market reaction, consistent with hypothesis 3. This implies 
informed investors with private information perceive monetary penalties more severely 
than the non-monetary penalties. Compared to the magnitude of stock market reaction 
between pre-event and event periods, the negative market reaction to fines is 
significantly stronger in [-15, -6] pre-event period (-13.4%) than the [-2, 2] event period 
(-6.0%). Monetary penalties have therefore resulted in greater shareholder wealth losses 
prior to punishment announcements, and at the formal announcement stage, the investor 
loss is lower. Model 4 reports insignificant coefficients of fraud variables, which 
suggest that informed investors are not sensitive to specific fraudulent behaviours.  
Turning to the control variables in Models 1-4, the largest ownership form is positive 
and significantly related to CARs. This is because investors perceive the post-fraud 
performance of the state-owned firms to be more likely to recover and less likely to 
deteriorate (Chen et al., 2016). The coefficients for big ten auditors are positive and 
statistically different from zero in Models 1 and 3. The result implies that if a firm is 
audited by one of the big ten auditors, a reduced negative market reaction to fraud 
announcement is experienced. This is because investors perceive big audit firms have 
motivation to provide stricter external monitoring to avoid ruining reputation (Yang, 
Jiao, & Buckland, 2017). CEO ownership is significantly negative related to market 
reaction, consistent with the result in Ali and Zhang (2015). Higher stock ownership 
creates greater motivation for CEOs to overstate earnings, which results in a significant 





Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Event window [-2, 2] [-2, 2] [-15, -6] [-15, -6] [-13, -6] [-12, -6] 
Criticism -0.036  0.032  -0.019 -0.035 
 (0.027)  (0.032)  (0.027) (0.023) 
Condemnation -0.039*  -0.052  -0.072** -0.057* 
 (0.021)  (0.038)  (0.034) (0.031) 
Fines -0.060*  -0.134***  -0.122*** -0.105*** 
 (0.032)  (0.051)  (0.039) (0.038) 
Rectification notice -0.059***  -0.004  -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.021) (0.017) 
Regulatory concern -0.047*  0.026  0.008 0.004 
 (0.026)  (0.038)  (0.039) (0.036) 
Letter of warning -0.025  -0.051  -0.061* -0.062** 
 (0.026)  (0.040)  (0.033) (0.026) 
Disclosed  -0.006  0.004   
  (0.020)  (0.027)   
Recognized & Disclosed  -0.043**  -0.060   
  (0.020)  (0.036)   
Duration 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Firm size -0.008 -0.005 -0.002 0.009 0.001 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Largest ownership 0.105 0.028 0.194 -0.005 0.223 0.133 
 (0.111) (0.123) (0.338) (0.253) (0.257) (0.231) 
Ownership form 0.078*** 0.065*** 0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.033) (0.035) (0.036) (0.033) 
Institutional ownership 0.181 0.045 -0.045 -0.123 -0.110 -0.083 
 (0.276) (0.319) (0.383) (0.338) (0.393) (0.329) 
Chairman change -0.023 -0.021 -0.015 -0.019 -0.027 -0.017 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.028) (0.023) (0.020) 
CEO change -0.001 -0.019 0.004 -0.015 0.016 0.001 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.019) 
Big ten audit 0.061** 0.089*** -0.015 0.023 -0.036 -0.048* 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.034) (0.042) (0.031) (0.028) 
CEO ownership -0.263*** -0.218*** -0.021 -0.071 -0.084 -0.029 
 (0.051) (0.064) (0.107) (0.115) (0.105) (0.068) 
Constant 0.133 0.069 -0.014 -0.201 -0.077 -0.117 
 (0.142) (0.174) (0.268) (0.299) (0.269) (0.276) 
Observations 433 433 433 433 433 433 
R-squared 0.328 0.250 0.080 0.073 0.126 0.127 
F-statistics 6.08*** 3.88*** 5.42*** 0.58 18.93*** 5.14*** 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: All of the variables are defined in the Table 3. ***, ** and *, denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels. The dependent variable is CARs over a [-2, 2] event window in the Models 1 
and 2, and over a [-15, -6] pre-event window in the Models 3 and 4, and over [-13, -6] [-12, -6] pre-event 
windows in Models 5 and 6. Firm fixed effects are controlled.  
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The ‘name and shame’ non-monetary punishments can be divided into two groups, 
including supervisory and self-disciplinary measures.13 With respect to supervisory 
measures, there is a significant and negative relationship between rectification notice, 
regulatory concern and CARs over a [-2, 2] event window in the Model 1. However, 
non-significant coefficients of three supervisory measures are reported in the Model 3 
by estimating CARs over a [-15, -6] pre-event window. This section re-runs the model 
by selecting CARs over shorter and concentrated pre-event windows [-13, -6] and [-12, 
-6].14 This is because a shorter pre-event window can better capture the potential 
information leakage of punishments, as it isolates the impact of other events that can 
occur within the same window (Basdas & Oran, 2014). 
The results are presented in Models 5-6. It is reported that the letter of warning has a 
significant and negative impact on CARs, while coefficients for rectification notice and 
regulatory concern are non-significant. This implies informed investors with private 
information perceive a letter of warning more severely than other supervisory measures. 
It is also reported that regulatory concern is the least severe supervisory punishment, as 
evidenced by the sign and magnitude of coefficients. These findings are in line with 
related guidance specified in the CSRC’s regulatory manual, in which the CSRC 
regional offices are instructed to issue statements of regulatory concern when there are 
general problems detected during the inspection of a firm’s financial statements. For 
more severe problems, they are instructed to issue letters of warning or rectification 
notices or adopt other supervisory measures (CSRC, 2012).  
In terms of self-disciplinary measures, the coefficients of public criticism are not 
significant, which indicates the capital market views them as non-severe punishments. 
Public condemnation is a severe punishment relative to public criticism, as evidenced 
by the significant and negative coefficient of public condemnation over both event 
                                                             
13 Punishments involving administrative warnings are selected as the reference group.  
14  This section chooses -13 and -12 as the beginning pre-event date because punishment 
information starts to leak to capital market 12-13 days prior to the formal regulatory 
announcements based on Wilcoxon Signed-rank tests.  
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windows and pre-event windows. This is consistent with Firth et al. (2016)’s argument 
that public condemnation should be used to punish relatively severe offences.  
These results indicate that although a few non-monetary punishments, such as public 
condemnation and letters of warning carry reputational losses to the fraudulent firms 
during the pre-event period, the costs are relatively limited. If the managers can manage 
the punishment information disclosure and firms’ stock prices can quickly absorb 
leaked information in the capital markets, the reputational costs are moderated 
following the regulatory announcements. Subsequently, the coefficients of these non-
monetary punishments are significant and negative in the pre-event period, but become 
either economically or statistically insignificant after fraud events are announced. On 
the other hand, monetary punishments carry far greater reputational costs to the 
fraudulent firms in both pre-event period and event period, as evidenced by the 
magnitude and sign of coefficients of fines. As a result, monetary punishments are less 
affected by information leakage and are more effective in addressing accounting fraud. 
 
4.4 Robustness tests 
The results of additional robustness tests are reported as follows. First, this section re-
estimates the previous models by using a broader classification of non-monetary 
punishments. In other words, variables i.e. rectification notice, regulatory concern and 
letter of warning are replaced with a dummy variable ‘supervisory measures’, and 
variables i.e. public criticism and condemnation are replaced with another dummy 
variable ‘self-measures’. The findings are presented in Panel A of Table 7, which 









Panel A: Broader classification of punishments 
Variables [-2, 2] CARs [-15, -6] CARs 
Fines -0.059* -0.133** 
Supervisory measures -0.059*** -0.009 
Self-measures -0.037** 0.012 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 433 433 
R-squared 0.325 0.036 
F-statistics 5.42*** 4.04*** 
Panel B: The size of fines and stock market reaction 
Variables [-2, 2] CARs [-15, -6] CARs 
Fines level -0.005* -0.011** 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 433 433 
R-squared 0.324 0.035 
F-statistics 5.41*** 1.98** 
Panel C: Fines and warnings imposed simultaneously  
Variables [-2, 2] CARs [-15, -6] CARs 
Fines level -0.011** -0.019* 
Fines level & Warn -0.006* -0.007 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 433 433 
R-squared 0.331 0.039 
F-statistics 5.88*** 3.23*** 
Panel D: Individual-level punishments 
Variables [-2, 2] CARs [-15, -6] CARs 
Fines -0.066* -0.132** 
Individual -0.124 -0.115** 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 451 451 
R-squared 0.303 0.123 
F-statistics 7.30*** 3.15*** 
Notes: All of the variables are defined in the Table 3. ***, ** and *, denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Supervisory measures equal to one if a firm has received rectification notice, 
regulatory concern or letter of warning from a regulator and zero otherwise. Self-measures equal to one 
if a firm has received criticism or condemnation from a regulator and zero otherwise. Fines level equals 
to the natural logarithm of one plus the amounts of fines if a firm only subjects to fines. Fines level & 
Warn equals to the natural logarithm of one plus the amounts of fines if a firm subjects to both warning 
and fines. Individual punishments equal to one if a firm commits fraud but only relevant individuals are 




Robustness tests (continued). 
Panel E: Two stage least squares method regression results 
Variables 
First stage Second stage 
Fines CARs [-2, 2] 
STATE 0.117***  
SUP -0.227***  
Fines1  -1.234*** 
Control variables & Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 451 451 
Wald Chi2  34.20** 
F statistic, instrument relevance  12.84*** 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (P-value)  0.343 (0.558) 
Hausman test Chi2 (P-value)  6.42 (0.989) 
Panel F: Calculating CARs using the market model 
Variables [-2, 2] CARs [-15, -6] CARs 
Fines -0.060* -0.134*** 
Control variables & Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 433 433 
R-squared 0.328 0.080 
F-statistics 6.07*** 5.51*** 
Panel G: Modified dependent variables 
Variables [0, 1] CARs [0, 2] CARs 
Fines -0.041** -0.055* 
Control variables & Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 433 433 
R-squared 0.261 0.324 
F-statistics 4.04*** 4.40*** 
Panel H: Addressing normality concerns   
Variables [-2, 2] CARs [-15, -6] CARs 
Fines -0.060* -0.148** 
Control variables & Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 433 433 
R-squared 0.326 0.070 
F-statistics 4.13*** 6.13*** 
Panel I: Difference-in-differences model   
Variables  [-2, 2] CARs 
Non-Fines*Post  -0.035** 
Control variables  Yes 
Observations  433 
R-squared  0.132 
F-statistics  1.72*** 
Notes:STATE is coded 1 if state owners have invested in a listed firm and zero otherwise. SUP is coded 1 if the number 
of supervisors in a listed firm is above the sample mean and zero otherwise. Fines1 is the predicted value of endogenous 
variable. Non-FINEs is coded one if a firm subjects to a non-monetary punishment and zero otherwise. Post is coded 
one if a punishment was made after the anti-corruption campaign started and zero otherwise. The remaining variables 
are as defined in the Table 3. ***, ** and *, denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. CARs, 
duration, firm size, largest ownership, institutional ownership and CEO ownership are transformed by taking natural 
logarithms in Panel H. Panel I uses a difference-in-differences model and controls industry and year effects. 
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Second, a few studies have assessed the relationship between the size of fines and the 
magnitude of investor losses. For instance, Karpoff et al. (2007) find that both private 
and regulatory monetary penalties are positively and significantly related to the 
measures of investors’ potential losses resulting from corporate misconduct in U.S. 
However, the non-monetary punishments are unrelated to the magnitude of the investor 
harm.15 This section estimates the association between the magnitude of fines and 
associated drops in stock market reaction by replacing the dummy variable ‘fines’ into 
the continuous variable ‘Fines level’ (i.e. natural logarithm of one plus the amounts of 
fines if a firm only subjects to fines).  
It is reported that there is a significant and negative relationship between the magnitude 
of fines and CARs in both [-2, 2] and [-15, -6] event windows (see Panel B). In other 
words, the larger the fine, the greater the fall in firm value. However, this finding needs 
to be interpreted with caution. In particular, under securities law the maximum fines 
imposed by the CSRC for corporate misrepresentation are 600,000 Yuan (about 
$90,000). Subsequently, no general conclusion whether regulators should impose 
higher fines on perpetrators to produce stronger retributive effect’ should be drawn, as 
the variable ‘Fines level’ is censored in the regression model.  
Third, as fines and warnings can be imposed simultaneously, this section re-estimates 
the stock market reaction to different punishments by taking the joint-punishment into 
consideration. An indicator variable (Fines level & Warn) is constructed, which equals 
the natural logarithm of one plus the amounts of fines if firms subject to both fines and 
warnings. Panel C presents the estimation results over [-2, 2] and [-15, -6] event 
windows. It is reported that ‘Fines level’ is associated with more negative stock market 
reaction than ‘Fines level & Warn’. This implies that the existence of warnings dilutes 
                                                             
15 Investor harm in Karpoff et al. (2007)’s paper is measured through a series of variables, 
including provable loss (a firm’s highest market value minus its value at the close of trading of 
the day after the enforcement event), public float (the percentage of a firm’s shares not owned 
by officers, directors or majority owners), violation period stock price run-up (CARs calculated 
over the violation period using value-weighted index of all stocks), insider trading dummy and 
fraud dummy (dichotomous variables that take a value of 1 if insider trading/fraud charges are 
included in regulatory proceedings and 0 otherwise).  
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the retributive effect of fines in addressing accounting fraud. 
Fourth, for firms committing accounting fraud, the Chinese regulatory institutions can 
punish both firms and individuals, but in some cases, they punish either the firms or the 
individuals, not both parties. Subsequently, this section re-estimates the regression 
model by including 18 cases where only the fraudulent individuals are punished. An 
indicator variable (individual punishments) is created and coded one if individuals 
rather than firms are punished and zero otherwise. The results are presented in the Panel 
D of Table 7. It is observed that cases receiving individual-level punishments are 
negatively associated with CARs over a [-15, -6] pre-event window. However, the 
coefficient of individual punishments becomes non-significant over a [-2, 2] event 
window as the related reputational costs have been moderated by information leakage. 
It is important to notice that regulatory fines trigger more negative stock market reaction 
than the firms receiving no firm-level punishment, which is consistent with previous 
main findings. 
Fifth, endogeneity concerns are addressed in this section. Endogeneity may arise 
between fines and stock market reaction, as fines affect stock market reactions and the 
latter might influence the former. Chen et al. (2011) propose that when making 
decisions about punishments, the CSRC considers several factors including investors 
losses, where the greater the investor losses, the greater possibility of firms being 
subject to heavy penalties. If this is the case, the regression model may produce biased 
and inconsistent estimates. This issue is addressed by instrumenting the fines measure 
as well as re-estimating the fixed-effects regression model for CARs using two-stage 
least squares (2-SLS) method. A Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) model is not 
adopted as it requires the use of lagged dependent variables as explanatory variables. A 
lagged dependent variable refers to the stock market reaction to a random event ahead 
of the announcement of fraud, which does not have any economic meaning in this study.  
Two instrumental variables used for fines are ‘STATE’ and ‘SUP’. STATE is coded 1 if 
state owners have invested in a listed firm and zero otherwise. For firms with 
investments from state or state agencies, they are more likely to carry out social 
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objectives with a negative impact on firm value (Wu, Wu, & Rui, 2012). Subsequently, 
these firms tend to commit more severe fraud, resulting in higher likelihood of fines. 
SUP is coded 1 if the number of supervisors in a listed firm is above the sample mean 
and zero otherwise. Large supervisory board size implies improved oversight and 
vigilance, leading to less severe punishments imposed on firms (Jia, Ding, Li, & Wu, 
2009). The appropriate instrumental variables must be correlated with the endogenous 
variable (Fines) but not correlated with the error term (Su, 2015).  
The 2-SLS method initially uses the endogenous variable (Fines) to regress the 
instrumental variables (STATE and SUP) and other exogenous covariates; the predicted 
value of endogenous variable (Fines1) can then be calculated. In the second stage, the 
predicted value of Fines1 replaces the observed value of Fines in the main regression 
equation to obtain the estimated coefficients. As Fines1 is a linear function of 
exogenous covariates and instrumental variables only, by construction there is zero 
covariance between Fines1 and the disturbance term ε𝑖𝑡 (Jaafar & El-Shawa, 2009). 
Panel E of Table 7 reports the 2-SLS estimation results. In the first stage, the STATE 
and SUP are significantly related to Fines at 1% level. The F-statistic for testing 
instrument relevance exceeds ten, supporting the strength of the instrumental 
variables.16 The Sargan-Hansen statistic for testing instrument exogeneity signifies 
that instrumental variables are jointly exogenous (Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015).17 The 
second stage coefficient estimates identify the effectiveness of punishments by studying 
stock market reaction. It is reported that Fines1 is related to more negative stock market 
reaction than other punishments, implying fines trigger the most severe investor losses. 
A Hausman test is conducted to examine the differences of coefficient estimates 
between fixed effects model and 2-SLS fixed effects model and confirms differences 
                                                             
16  Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest that the F-statistic should exceed ten to demonstrate 
instrument relevance. It is reported that F-statistic equals to 12.84 in this research, implying 
instrumental variable is useful in explaining the variation in the endogenous covariate. 
17 The specific Sargan-Hansen statistic can be undertaken in the overidentifying cases when the 
number of instruments exceeds the number of endogenous variables. The null hypothesis for 
the Sargan-Hansen statistic is that all instruments are exogenous. The result cannot reject the 
null hypothesis and it is concluded that all the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. 
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between two estimators are statistically insignificant. 
Sixth, the regression model is re-estimated by calculating CARs through the market 
model. Market model reflects a linear relationship between individual stock returns and 
the benchmark market returns. The findings (Panel F) are qualitatively identical as those 
reported in the Table 6. This section also modifies the event window of dependent 
variable CARs to a 2-day post-event window [0, 1] and a 3-day post-event window [0, 
2] and re-examines the relationship between CARs and punishments. It is reported that 
investors perceive fines more severely than non-monetary punishments (see Panel G of 
Table 7). Moreover, normality concern is addressed. Results of standard tests on 
skewness and kurtosis indicate a problem with the normality assumption. Hence, for 
non-dummy variables show substantial departure from normality, this section 
transforms the data by taking natural logarithms.18 The results are presented in Panel 
H and it is reported that the main findings are qualitatively similar.  
Seventh, this section uses a difference-in-differences (DID) model and examines the 
impact of punishments on stock market reaction following the start of anti-corruption 
campaign. President Xi Jinping officially took office in the 18th National Congress of 
the Communist Party of China on the 14th November 2012. Shortly after his 
assumption of the presidency of the party, the party promulgated eight provisions and 
corrected ‘four winds’ to regulate the party members, which signals the beginning of 
the anti-corruption campaign (Zhang, 2018).19  
To run a DID model, this section creates a variable Non-Fines (treatment firms), which 
equals to one if a firm receives a non-monetary punishment and zero otherwise; and a 
variable Post, which equals one to if a firm was punished in the post anti-corruption 
                                                             
18 For variables with an absolute skew value larger than 2 or an absolute kurtosis larger than 7, 
they can be considered as having substantial non-normality (Kim, 2013). In Model 14, CARs, 
duration, firm size, largest ownership, institutional ownership and CEO ownership are 
transformed by taking natural logarithms.  
19 According to the official record of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, more 
than 40 central and local officials had been investigated during the anti-corruption campaign 
by the end of 2014. However, only 6-8 central or local officials had been investigated each year 
prior to the anti-corruption campaign. 
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campaign period and zero otherwise. The variable of interest in the regression model is 
the coefficient of the interaction term (Non-Fines*Post), which captures the impact of 
non-monetary punishments on stock market reaction in the anti-corruption campaign 
period. Panel I presents the results and it shows a significant and negative coefficient 
on the interaction term. The results suggest that, relative to the firms receive fines, firms 
subject to non-monetary punishments experience a significant decrease in stock market 
reaction subsequent to the start of anti-corruption campaign.  
5 Conclusions 
In this study the effectiveness of different monetary and non-monetary ‘name and 
shame' punishments for accounting fraud are assessed. This is undertaken through 
examining the stock market reaction to the regulatory reporting of such crimes in China 
from 2007 to 2016. Overall, punishment has a significant impact on the market value 
of fraudulent firms. The magnitude of the investor losses ranges from -0.2% to -0.5%, 
indicating a statistically but not economically significant impact on fraudulent firms. 
This value is lower than previous Chinese studies which have not incorporated regional 
office announcements.  
Using a regression model, this study estimates investors perceive punishments 
involving monetary penalties more severely than those without monetary penalties. 
This result occurs as monetary penalties not only result in direct cash outflows yet lose 
reputation for fraudulent firms. Monetary penalties indeed speak very loudly in China 
and enforcement in severe fraud cases may need to use fines liberally and be aware of 
the limitations of non-monetary ‘name and shame’ punishments. Stock markets can also 
discriminate among different fraudulent behaviours and react less significantly to the 
disclosure than the combination of disclosure and recognition fraud. This may arise 
from different perceptions of recognized and disclosed items, leading investors to value 
false recognition of items more than false disclosure of items. This study also finds 
information leakage prior to the announcement of punishments. Informed investors 
with such private information perceive monetary penalties more severely than the non-
monetary penalties; results which remain robust after conducting additional analysis. 
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The findings of this study offer important theoretical and practical implications for 
improving the effectiveness of punishments in addressing accounting fraud. First, 
meaningful monetary penalties play an important role in forming a strong enforcement 
program. This result may arise from the imperfect legal environment and unique 
ownership structure in China, which encourages investors to perceive fines have 
retributive effects and produce sufficient disutility to outweigh gains from fraud. The 
paper acknowledges that there are limitations of financial penalties, such as the use of 
fines primarily hits shareholders who have no direct responsibilities for fraud. The U.S. 
SEC has not been shy about promoting its use of monetary penalties in last decade, but 
the SEC is facing increased criticism for heavy reliance on fines as they are not always 
sufficient and can send the wrong signal to market participants (Steinway, 2014). 
Therefore, although monetary penalties shout very loudly in Chinese capital markets, 
they need to be used with caution. The CSRC should not always impose monetary 
sanctions against corporations, and when it does, it should tie the amount to the gains 
generated by fraudulent behaviours.  
Second, as investors view punishments for different types of fraud distinctly, more strict 
disclosure regulations associated with financial reporting are needed. Further, when a 
disclosure fraud is deemed to be serious, especially in relation to false disclosure of 
material related party transactions, investment status, accounting policies and 
guaranteed items (Zhu & Gao, 2011), harsher punishments need to be imposed and fully 
enforced even if investors react less negatively. In doing so, regulators can increase the 
costs of disclosure fraud and help investors understand the value to comprehending a 
firm’s disclosed items. 
Third, information leakage prior to formal punishment announcements is observed. To 
keep corporate insiders and other informed investors from trading on non-public 
information and prevent information leakage, regulatory gaps in China’s Securities 
Laws need to be addressed. In particular, China’s Securities Law only addresses the 
cases regarding traders using leaked information to make profits, yet not traders using 
leaked information to avoid losses (Weng & Jia, 2015). Moreover, selective 
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enforcement of regulations in China may amplify the level of information asymmetry 
between informed insiders and outside investors (Chen et al., 2011). Therefore, 
regulators need to fully enforce regulations and revise the Securities Law to avoid such 
loopholes for informed investors to profit from non-public material information.  
Our study has two limitations, which provide avenues for future research. First, this 
study focuses on the impact of punishment announcement on the short-term stock 
returns. The longer-term economic consequences caused by financial statement fraud 
are still unknown to investors. Hitz et al. (2012) argue that the stock market needs 
several days to fully react to punishment news, as the lack of experience interpreting 
enforcement measures precludes investors from comprehending the punishment 
announcements’ implications in the short-term. Tibbs et al. (2011) find the negative 
abnormal returns reach a trough around the third year after the disclosure of corporate 
misconduct. Therefore, future research is expected to direct its attention to the long-
term implications of punishment announcements for shareholder wealth. 
Second, this study only examines the impact of different punishments on shareholder 
valuation of listed firms. Future studies can go beyond examining investors’ stock 
market reaction and focus on how the disclosure of fraud affects firms’ different 
stakeholders’ activities when studying the economic consequences of fraud. For 
instance, suppliers are expected to change the terms of trade with which they do 
business with the firms (Karpoff et al., 2008). Banks tend to grant loans with 
significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, more covenant restrictions and a higher 
likelihood of being secured to fraud firms (Graham et al., 2008). Customers may be 
apprehensive in dealing with firms that have a dishonest management, reducing the 
demand for the fraud firm's products (Johnson et al., 2014). As different stakeholders 
are heterogeneous and affected by firms’ activities to a different extent, more attention 
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